No thing refers to Nothing. On showing the False by Demeter, Márton
 Address for Correspondence: Marton Demeter, email: demeter.marton[at]kre.hu 
Article received on the 10th February, 2015. Article accepted on the 18th May, 2015.                                
















Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church, Hungary 
 
 
Abstract: This discussion tries to explicate some epistemological problems in 
connection with negation and the so-called godelian sentences. The paper examines 
some methods of generating negative formulas from positive bases, an proposes 
alternative methods which with some antinomic formula could be eliminated. The 
discussion tries to show, that some epistemological antinomies arise from the natural 
language, and most formal languages inherit the natural (and maybe false) way of 
indicating negations.   
 
 







This short paper tries to show that some of the problems revealed by Godel  not necessarily 
hold for any logical system:  under specific conditions the godelian problem could be 
eliminated. Naturally, this fact is dearly reconcilable with the godelian habit of mind, so the 
proposal of this paper is an alternative method for showing the False, where the rather 
problematic term is, of course, not ’the False’ but ’showing’. Nevertheless, there are rocks 
ahead, so let’s start with the lighter one.  
 
In logic, the falsity of something could be conteptualized many ways depending on the 
logical status of that entity which is (or thought to be) false. So logicians are referring to false 
(or contrafactual) cases, false sentences or false propositions as well. In the formalism, just 
like in most of our languages, the falsity of an entity (and, formally, the falsity of a symbol 
or, which is not the same, the falsity of a formula) ought to be represented as a true entity 
labeled with a sign for negation. This paper aims that the above mentioned fact shows an 
inherent property of symbolic representation systems (such as natural languages and 
symbolic notational systems), and that this fact tends to misguide the philosophical thinking 
about the world. 
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On the False 
 
Suppose that Frege  has right when he said that the reference of a sentence is its truth-value, 
which, according to the classical two-valued logic, could be the Truth and the False.  For the 
purpose of the discussion this paper lets the philosphical problems caused by this two ideal 
objects unmentioned, and supposes that there could be a possible world where the False is an 
ideal object being the reference of all false sentences (so, the concept of the False originates 
in Frege, but the followings would be surely not fregeian).  
 
In additon, suppose that symbols (or, more precisely, notational marks) could be 
comprehensible as fragment of formulas. The reference of complex formulas is then the 
False, and the reference of formulas interconnected with the mark of negation  is a fragment 
of the False. It could be said without oversimplification that the symbols or formulas in the 
scope of the sign of negation  has the same reference, namely, the False.  
In the case of symbolic representational systems negation marks make formulas more 
complex, which could deceptively suggest that the so-called negative facts (if there are any), 
which are in correspondance with negotiated formulas could be comprehended as analysable 
entities. This paper would like to suggest that an analysis of this kind could not be performed. 
Philosophers analyzing negative facts always analyzing formulas of symbolic 
representational systems: in the False, as a reference, there is nothing to analyse. 
 
On representing so-called negative facts 
 
Before proposing an alternative way of showing the False (where ’showing’ will be 
distinguished from ’representing’), the discussion presents some ordinary methods of 
representing negative facts. The following linguistic and logical representations also shows 
that negative-fact-representations (NFR) are derived from positive-fact-representations 
(PFR), so formally, NFRs are more complex than PFRs, when ’complexity’ should be 
measured simply by the number of the constituent marks. For example, consider the 
following primitive PFR: 
(1)  This is a red circle. 
The negative of the proposition represented by (1) could be represented at least two 
ways: 
(2)  This is not a red circle. 
(3)  It’s untrue, that this is a red circle. 
In ordinary language, the meaning of (2) and (3) seems to be identical, but their logical 
structure is different, because (2) negates a predicate (or, in linguistic terms, an open or 
imperfect sentence), (3) negates a proposition (or a compound sentence). This 
distinction could be more easily represented with a variation of (1): 
(4)  This circle is red. 
where the sole logically correct negation is the following: 
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(5)  It’s untrue, that this circle is red. 
 The following NFRs are all originates in (4), but neither in ordinary language, nor in 
logical formalism are them considered as synonyms.  
(6)  This circle is not red. 
(7)  This red (thing) is not a circle.   
(8)  This is not a red circle.  
The above mentioned linguistic examples could be easily represented without the 
classical demarcation of arguments and predicates. Let all meaningful elements be 
represented successively with A,B,C,D at this point without referring their usually 
logical categories, let the  represent negation, and ‹,›   the ordering of the elements.1 
So (1) – (8) could be formalized as follows: 
(1a)   ‹AB‹CD›› 
 ‹This is‹red circle››  
 
(2a)  ‹AB ‹‹CD››› 
 ‹This is ‹not‹red circle››› 
 
  or 
(2aa)  ‹A‹B›‹CD›› 
 ‹This‹is not›‹red circle›› 
 
(3a)  ‹‹AB‹CD›› 
 ‹It’s untrue, that‹this is‹red circle›› 
 
(4a) ‹‹AD›BC›› 
 ‹‹This circle›is red›› 
 
(5a)  ‹‹‹AD›BC›› 
 ‹It’s untrue, that‹‹this circle›is red›› 
 
(6a) ‹‹AD›B‹C›› 




 ‹‹This circle›‹is not›red›› 
 
                                                 
1
 Of course all indication (including and ‹,›) could be represented with the letters of the alphabet (or, with 
natural numbers, as Godel numbered them).  For the sake of traceableness this paper uses special symbols for 
negation and ordering, but it’s formalism could be easily translated to formulas where no distinction shold be 
done in indication. For example,  could be substituted in it’s any occurances to Z, ‹ to Y and › to X.   
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(7a) ‹‹AC›B‹D›› 
 ‹‹This red (thing)›is‹not circle›› 
 
 or 
(7aa)  ‹‹AC›‹B›‹D›› 
 ‹‹This red (thing)›‹is not›‹circle›› 
 
(8a) ‹AB‹CD›› 
 ‹This is not‹red circle›› 
 
 or 
(8aa)  ‹A‹B›‹CD›› 
 ‹This‹is not›‹red circle›› 
 
 Even a bald example like this could show that negations, more precisely, 
representations of negative statements, derives from representations of their positive 
bases.  Naturally, it could be said that the syntax of a given formal language determines 
the possible places of signs for negation, but for the purpose of this paper the place of 
the negation mark does not matters. Representations, so, formulas for negative 
statements are derives from positive formulas, moreover, they become, by addition of 
negation mark(s), more complex than their positive bases irrespectively of the syntax of 
the language they belong to.  
c1 Let the fact, that in symbolic representational systems, such as formal and natural 
languages, negative formulas are derived from positive bases by addition, be our first 
consideration. 
 From a pre-philosophical perspective one could easily affirm that a negative fact is not 
a complex one derives from a correlated positive fact but is not a fact at all. So he could 
also easily say that there are no things in the world (and no one should ask a pre-
philosophical one for a definition of „the world”) which could be labeled as negative 
ones. And, he could conclude that if there are no negative things so there could not be 
negative facts which are relations of things (maybe our pre-philosophical agent  proved 
to be unconsciously early-wittgensteinian).  
 An agent of this kind would soon recognise that negative facts could be only perceived 
as formulas, namely, as negations of representations for positive facts. Negative 
formulas are in correlation with formulas of a given language: they are grounded in 
language, and not in the world, as positive formulas being in correlation with facts 
(now our pre-philosophical agent surely proved to be early-wittgensteinian).  
 Suppose that an agent of this kind would pose the question if a symbolic representation 
system could be in correlation with the world. Now he would deny c1 for a language of 
this kind, and will consider negations as pure absence. When negations are the absence 
of positive facts then negative formulas should derives from positive facts by 
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abstraction (he won’t say subtraction by design). It means that negative formulas should 
not be written or said: they should be shown as the absence of positive ones.  
c2 Let the fact, that in a symbolic language correspondes with the world negative formulas 
derives from positive facts by abstraction, be our second consideration.  
 Now suppose that our agent tries to represent the formulas (2a) – (8aa) taking account 
of c2 (his transformations leaves formulas without negation marks untouched, so 
formulas of this kind should not be mentioned here). His transformations () run as 
follows.  
(2b)  ‹AB ‹‹CD›››  ‹AB› 
 ‹This is ‹not‹red circle››› ‹This is› 
 
  or 
(2bb)  ‹A‹B›‹CD›› ‹A‹CD›› 
 ‹This‹is not›‹red circle›› ‹This‹red circle›› 
 
(3b) ‹‹AB‹CD››  
 ‹It’s untrue, that‹this is‹red circle››  
 
(5b)  ‹‹‹AD›BC››  
 ‹It’s untrue, that‹‹this circle›is red››  
 
(6b) ‹‹AD›B‹C›› ‹‹AD›B› 
 ‹‹This circle›is‹not red›› ‹‹This circle›is› 
 
 or 
(6bb) ‹‹AD›‹B›C›› ‹‹AD›C› 
 ‹‹This circle›‹is not›red›› ‹‹This circle›red› 
 
(7b) ‹‹AC›B‹D›› ‹‹AC›B› 
 ‹‹This red (thing)›is‹not circle›› ‹‹This red (thing)›is› 
 
 or 
(7bb)  ‹‹AC›‹B›‹D›› ‹‹AC›‹D›› 
 ‹‹This red (thing)›‹is not›‹circle›› ‹‹This red (thing)›‹circle›› 
 
(8b) ‹AB‹CD›› ‹AB› 
 ‹This is not‹red circle›› ‹This is› 
 
 or 
(8bb)  ‹A‹B›‹CD›› ‹A‹CD›› 
 ‹This‹is not›‹red circle›› ‹This‹red circle›› 
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 Looking on the results of his transformations our agent would recognise that he has 
produced formulas of the following kinds. First, he has produced open senteces with 
blank places for predicates (such in the case of (2b), (6b), (7b), (8b)). Second, he has 
produced agrammatical sentences without copulation (such in the case of (2bb), (6bb), 
(7bb), (8bb)). And, finally, he has produced, or, more precisely, he has shown the 
absence of any positive fact, so he has erased all the formulas (such in the case of  (3b), 
(5b)). 
Godelian sentences without negation 
 So, in symbolic representational systems adopting c2 formulas include negation marks 
could not be represented. Considering a symbolic representation system withour 
negation mark in its vocabulary, this statement on representation is a pure tautology 
because of the fact that, of course, which has no marks for representing could not be 
represented. This poses two questions, first, how formulas of a given language 
including negation marks could be explicated or transformed into c2-based formulas, 
and, second, how could a representational system without negation marks show so-
called negative facts? Let’s pose the first question employing two ycleped godelian 
sentence. 
(9) This sentence is not true. 
(10) This formula is not provable. 
 Let’s try to formalize (ix)-(x) with the former method of this discussion. 
(9a) ‹‹AB›C‹D›› 








 It’s untrue, that‹‹this sentence›is true› 
 
 The c2-transformations run as follows: 
(9b) ‹‹AB›C‹D›› ‹‹AB›C› 




 ‹‹This sentence›‹is not›true›‹‹This sentence›true› 





 It’s untrue, that‹‹this sentence›is true› 
 
 The logical structure of (x) is the very same as (ix)’s: 
 
(10a) ‹‹AB›C‹D›› 








 It’s untrue, that‹‹this formula›is provable› 
  
(10b) ‹‹AB›C‹D›› ‹‹AB›C› 








 It’s untrue, that‹‹this formula›is provable› 
 
 So, in a symbolic representation system meets the requirements of c2 the godelian 
formulas (9) and (10) could be represented as open sentences (such as (9b-10b) or 
agrammatical formulas (such as (9bb-10bb) or as absence of formulas (such as (9bbb-
10bbb). But since neither open sentences, nor agrammatical ones have meaning, it 
seems that the sole meaningful c2-translations of the above analized godelian sentences 
are (9bbb) and (10bbb), so, the abscence of any notation. 
 
c3 Let the fact that in a c2-based language showing the False means the abscence of the 
representation of the negated proposition be our third consideration.   
 
 It could not be overemphasized that, despite the fact that in reality no one could show 
(or even imagine) negative facts, in natural and formal languages c2 hardly ever holds. 
Only the capacity of language empowers it’s users to form contrafactual representations 
which are false representations of positive facts, and not representations of the False.  
 





Two proposals for showing the False. 
 
 This short paper, naturally,  could not analyze the causes of the above mentioned 
tradition, nor could it examine the possibility of a symbolic system without mark(s) for 
negation, but only focuses the question if negation could be shown without any special 
notation. The first proposal could be extricated from c3: marks in the scope of a 
negation symbol should be erased along with the negation symbol, so no meaningful 
sentences which entail negation mark could be represented.  
 
p1 Let this proposal be called the apophatic way of showing the False.  
 
 Since all false sentences signify the False, they could be uniformly represented as an 
abscence of formulas. This pre-philosophical, bald way of representing negation is so 
evident that no current representational system adopted it. As it had been earlier 
mentioned this fact may be the result of the natural languages, which have the symbolic 
capacity for representing contrafactual cases. But, which is far more interesting, 
diagrammatic logical systems, that could be regarded as alternatives for symbolic 
systems don’t differ them in this regard: consider the diagrammatic systems of Venn, 
Euler, Peirce, Spencer Brown or Sun-joo Shin. They all have special mark (which could 
be, of course, diagrammatic) for negation. Still, the author of this paper thinks that the 
alternative way of showing the False arises from iconic alias  diagrammatic logical 
systems. A logical system of this kind would easily fit for c2, since any representation 
proved to be a representation of a negative proposition could be erased without serious 
problems. Setting up such a logical system would be a concern of some account, but it 
would surely transcended the objectives of this short paper.   
 
 The second proposal of this discussion for showing the False is, simply and solely: 
showing the Truth.  
 
p2 Let this proposal be called the kataphatic way of showing the False. 
 
 Suppose, that there are no reasonable objections for marking complex formulas with 
symbols substituting them, so formulas entail marks for negation could be substituted 
[] with [E] as follows.  
 
(2c)  ‹AB ‹‹CD›››  ‹AB‹E›› 
 ‹This is ‹not‹red circle››› ‹This is‹whatever but a red circle›› 
 
  or 
(2cc)  ‹A‹B›‹CD››  ‹A‹E›‹CD›› 
 ‹This‹is not›‹red circle›› ‹This‹whatever but is›‹red circle›› 
 
(3c) ‹‹AB‹CD›› ‹E› 
 ‹It’s untrue, that‹this is‹red circle››  ‹Whatever but the case that this is a   
      red circle› 
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(5c)  ‹‹‹AD›BC›› ‹E› 
 ‹It’s untrue, that‹‹this circle›is red››  ‹Whatever but the case that this   
           circle is red› 
 
(6c) ‹‹AD›B‹C›› ‹‹AD›B‹E›› 
 ‹‹This circle›is‹not red›› ‹‹This circle›is‹whatever but red›› 
 
 or 
(6cc) ‹‹AD›‹B›C›› ‹‹AD›‹E›C›› 
 ‹‹This circle›‹is not›red›› ‹‹This circle›‹whatever but is›red› 
 
(7c) ‹‹AC›B‹D›› ‹‹AC›B‹E›› 
 ‹‹This red (thing)›is‹not circle››‹‹This red (thing)›is‹whatever but circle›› 
 
 or 
(7cc)  ‹‹AC›‹B›‹D›› ‹‹AC›‹E›‹D››  
 ‹‹This red (thing)›‹is not›‹circle››‹‹This red (thing)›‹whatever but   
                       is›‹circle›› 
 
(8c)  ‹AB‹CD›› ‹ABE› 
 ‹This is not‹red circle›› ‹This is‹whatever but a red circle›› 
 or 
(8cc)  ‹A‹B›‹CD›› ‹A‹E›‹CD›› 
 ‹This‹is not›‹red circle›› ‹This‹whatever but is›‹red circle›› 
 
 
(9c) ‹‹AB›C‹D›› ‹‹AB›C‹E›› 








 It’s untrue, that‹‹this sentence›is true› ‹Whatever but the case that this   
             sentence is true› 
 
(10c) ‹‹AB›C‹D›› ‹‹AB›C‹E›› 
 ‹‹This formula›is‹not provable››‹‹This formula›is‹whatever but    
         provable›› 
 
 or 
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(10cc) ‹‹AB›‹C›D›‹‹AB›‹E›D› 
 ‹‹This formula›‹is not›provable›‹‹This formula›‹whatever but    
        is›provable› 
 or 
(10ccc) ‹‹AB›CD›‹E› 
 It’s untrue, that‹‹this formula›is provable›‹Whatever but the case that   
         this sentence is true› 
 
 As it could be shown by the formalism, p2-formulas use the variable E for substituting 
negated formulas. Of course, if it is necessary,  E itself could be substituted  or, more 
precisely, E could be transliterated to an adequate value of the variable. Transliteration 
of this kind depends on the logical (or: grammatical) position of the substituted 
negative formula. Since in reality, as opposed to languages, there are no non-reds but 
(for example) greens, there are no non-circles but squares etc., p2-formulas could 
substitute variables with their values as follows. 
(2d)  ‹This is‹whatever but a red circle›› This is ‹a green square› 
 
  or 
(2dd)  ‹This‹whatever but is›‹red circle››‹This ‹used to be›‹red circle›› 
 
(3d) ‹Whatever but the case that this is a red circle›‹It’s raining› 
 
(5d)  ‹Whatever but the case that this circle is red›‹It’s raining› 
 
(6d) ‹‹This circle›is‹whatever but red››‹‹This circle›is‹blue›› 
 
 or 
(6dd) ‹‹This circle›‹whatever but is›red›‹‹This circle›‹should be›red› 
 
(7d) ‹‹This red (thing)›is‹whatever but circle››‹‹This red (thing)›is‹square›› 
 
 or 
(7dd)  ‹‹This red (thing)›‹whatever but is›‹circle››‹‹This red (thing)›‹used to   
            be›‹circle›› 
 
(8d) ‹This is‹whatever but a red circle››‹This is‹a house›› 
 
 or 




(9d) ‹‹This sentence›is‹whatever but true››‹‹This sentence›is‹simple›› 




(9dd) ‹‹This sentence›‹whatever but is›true›‹‹This sentence›‹used to be›true› 
 
 or 
(9ddd) ‹Whatever but the case that this sentence is true›‹It’s raining› 
 
(10d) ‹‹This formula›is‹whatever but provable››‹‹This formula›is‹complex›› 
 
 or 
(10dd) ‹‹This formula›‹whatever but is›provable›‹‹This formula›‹seems to   
       be›provable› 
 or 
(10ddd) ‹Whatever but the case that this sentence is true›‹It’s raining› 
 
 It could by seen at first sight that the transliterations above need some explanation. 
Let’s start with the easier problems. The fact that a certain  proposition could be uttered 
different ways depending on the rules of  various representation systems makes no any 
puzzle. In a language containing marks for negation, transliterations of the following 
kind are free of any problem. 
(11) ‹A›  ‹‹A› 
(12) ‹A›  ‹‹‹A››› 
 Consider that A could substitute any formula, whether atomic or complex, so which 
holds for atomic formulas holds for complex ones, too. For example, (11)-(12) could be 
transliterated as follows: 
(11a) ‹This is a red circle›  ‹it’s not true, that‹it’s not true, that ‹this is a red   
          circle› 
(12a) It’s not true, that‹this is a red circle›  ‹it’s not true, that‹it’s not true,   
             that‹it’s not true, that‹this is a    
            red circle››› 
 But in a c2-language, where there are no marks for negations, formulas like (11)-(12) 
could not be represented as negated marks, so negated formulas have to be deleted 
(that’s what this discussion earlier called as p1, the apophatic way of showing the 
False), or represented by substitution (that’s what this discussion earlier called as p2, 
the kataphatic way of showing the False). The apophatic method makes no difficulties, 
if we consider indication and deleting as the reverse operations of each other.  
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c4 Let the fact that, for any formula A, there could be constructed a formula B which 
excludes A, be our fourth consideration.  
 In classical logics c4 answers to the law of contradiction, and, using the negation mark 
it could be formalized as follows. 
(13) ‹AA›  ‹AA› 
 which means, by c4 and then c2, that 
(13a) ‹AB›  ‹AB› 
 The problems gerenated by the logical consequences of formulas like (13) and (13a) are 
well known; but for the purpose of this paper discussions on the nature and 
consequences of contradictions need not to be involved. But even if we suppose that the 
law of constradiction holds for logic, we still have enough puzzle in the realm of 
ordinary language.  
 Usually,  values for excluding formulas could be easily found in the realm of 
predicative terms: values for (13a) could be generated from the examples of this paper 
as follows. 
(13c) ‹AA›  ‹AA›  ‹AB›  ‹AB› 
 It’s not possible, that‹...red and not-red› ‹...red (x)or not-red›2 
 It’s not possible, that‹...red and green›‹...red (x)or green› 
 
(13d) ‹AA›  ‹AA›  ‹AB›  ‹AB› 
  It’s not possible, that‹...circle and not-circle› ‹...circle (x)or not-circle› 
 It’s not possible, that‹...circle and square›‹...circle (x)or square› 
 
 Demarkating predicates to argument makes no difference here, as it could be seen by 
(14) and (15).  
(14) It’s not possible, that‹this circle is‹red and not-red›› 
  ‹ This circle is ‹red (x)or not-red›› 
   It’s not possible, that‹this circle is‹red and green› 
 ‹This circle is‹red (x)or green›› 
 
(15) It’s not possible, that‹ this is a red ‹circle and not-circle›› 
  ‹This is a red ‹circle(x)or not-circle›› 
   It’s not possible, that‹This is a red ‹circle and square›› 
 ‹This is a red ‹circle (x)or square›› 
 
 Sentences like (1)-(8) could be easily represented with the above exemplified 
transformations, because, if the ordering is calculated, the complexity of a given 
formula will not alter the method of the transformations. 
                                                 
2
 Alas, it’s hard to find an adequate ordinary english term for XOR-operator. The famous english translation for 
Kierkegaard’s Enten-Eller  has the title Either/Or, which, after all, sounds better than XOR. 
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 Alas, a more serious problem would occur when the range of the negation mark covers 
the copula directly.
3
 The root of the hardship is the fact that, in logical sense,  there are 
no generally accepted term excludes „is”. Only negated „is” fits for excluding „is” in 
any sense of the much problematic term. Still, c4 transformations for the general uses 
of „is” could be made as follows.  
(16) Mary is not. 
 It’s not possible, that‹Mary‹is and is not›› 
  ‹Mary ‹is (x)or not-is›› 
   It’s not possible, that‹Mary ‹is and ›› 
 ‹Mary ‹is (x)or ›› 
 
(17) Mary is not Mrs.Grundy. 
 It’s not possible, that‹Mary is ‹Mrs.Grundy and not-Mrs.Grundy›› 
  ‹Mary is‹Mrs.Grundy (x)or not-Mrs.Grundy›› 
   It’s not possible, that‹Mary is ‹Mrs.Grundy and Mrs.Turner›› 
 ‹Mary is ‹Mrs.Grundy (x)or Mrs.Turner›› 
 
(18) Mary is not a girl. 
 It’s not possible, that‹Mary is‹girl and not-girl›› 
  ‹Mary is‹girl (x)or not-girl›› 
   It’s not possible, that‹Mary is‹girl and boy›› 
 ‹Mary is‹girl (x)or boy›› 
 
(19) Mary is not beautiful. 
 It’s not possible, that‹Mary is‹beautiful and not-beautiful›› 
  ‹Mary is‹beautiful (x)or not-beautiful›› 
   It’s not possible, that‹Mary is‹beautiful and ugly›› 
 ‹Mary is‹beautiful (x)or ugly›› 
 
 It seems that the copulative uses of „is” don’t make any problem: identity (17), class 
membership (18) and predication (19) could be represented in a c4-language. But it 
could be easily discovered that we can’t speak of pure c4-transformations here. Pure 
c4-transformations substitute negated formulas with the excluders of their positive 
bases, for example, when B sustitutes A, because B excludes A via ‹AB›. But in the 
case of formulas like (16)-(18), the „negated is” should be substituted with its positive 
base, namely, with „is”, and the related formula in the scope of „is” should be 
substituted with its excluder, too. The logical structures of (18)-(19) make easy to 
decide which formula is related to the copula. It’s obvious that, for example, the 
statements „Mary is beautiful” and „Mary is ugly” exclude each other, but the same 
does not holds for statemts „Mary is beautiful” and „Sarah is beautiful”. So, here class-
terms should be substituted. Unlike (18) and (19), in the case of identity (17), any 
formula could be substituted along substituting „not is” with „is”. So, the formulas 
„Mary is Mrs.Grundy” and „Mary is Mrs.Turner” exclude each other, just like the 
                                                 
3
 This paper tries not to consider the gigantean philosophical tradition in connection with the copulation and 
existential statements.  
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formulas „Mary is Mrs. Grundy” and „Sue is Mrs.Grundy”, while, of course, 
substituting both formulas effects „Sue is Mrs.Turner” which does not make an 
excluder, since „Mary is Mrs.Grundy” and „Sue is Mrs.Turner” could be 
simultaneously true.  
 The most problematic formula is (16), as it have been expected, because we don’t have 
any term excludes the „is” as substantive verb. Of course substituting the relates of „is” 
won’t help here, because the statement „Sue is” will not exclude the statement „Mary 
is” at all. So all that could be done is to substitute „not-is” with an arbitrary formula  
which is, by definition, excludes „is”. Let an empty space signify , (16) would be 
described as follows. 
(16a) It’s not possible, that‹Mary ‹is and ›› 
  It’s not possible, that‹Mary ‹is and    ›› 
 
 ‹Mary ‹is (x)or ››‹Mary ‹is (x)or   ›› 
 
 Alas, what holds for „is” – as a value of „to be” – holds for „true” as well, because the 
word „false” has no substancial meaning but not-true. Fortunatelly, in a language fits 
for c3, „true” can be express without any special indication, or, more precisely, only 
true formulas could be expressed at all. And, considering c3, „not-true” could be shown 
as absence, which means that the abscence and the indication excludes each other, as 
truth excludes falsity. So a c3-c4 compatible language should not have any special 
indication for „true” and „false”, because of the fact that  indication entails the truth of 
the relatad formulas, and the abscence of formulas entails all negated formulas. When 
 stands for formulas should not be indicated in a c2-3 language, the godelian formula 
(9) could be transformed as follows. 
(9e) ‹‹This sentence›is‹not-true››‹‹This sentence›is›‹› 
 ‹This sentence is› 
 
 or 
(9ee) ‹‹This sentence›‹is-not›true›‹‹This sentence›‹›› 
 ‹This sentence› 
 
 or 
(9eee)  It’s not true, that‹‹this sentence› is true››‹› 
   
 
 It’s not a surprise then, that the formula „this sentence is true” could be formalized in a 
c2-c3 language exactly in the same way like „this sentence is not true”. Since neither 
truth, nor false could be indicated per se, they could not assist in the course of logical 
analysis. So a c2-c3 language could indicate true statements by formulas correspond 
true facts, and negative statements could be shown by an absense of formulas. 
  
Demeter, M.                                                                                                                              30 
 
 The godelian formula (9) could not be represented in a c2-c3 language, so the question 
of it’s truth-value could not be occured. So neither „true”, nor „not-true” is a predicate, 
but they are opposite states of indication. 
 
 Indication is a state, not a statement. 
 
 6. Summary  
 
 This short paper proposed an alternative method for handling negations. Because there 
are no negative facts, negative formulas need not to be indicated, but so-called negative 
statements could be shown by showing the False.  
 
 The discussion shows that natural languages and most formal languages derive negative 
sentences from their positive bases, which method could be called as showing the False 
by addition (c1). This paper proposed a different method, which derives the False by 
abstraction (c2).  In a c2-language showing the False means excluding it’s positive 
base. 
 
 Excluding the False could be achieved two ways. First, the apophatic way of showing 
the False (p1) means erasement: since all negated formula could be deleted, an 
apophatic representation indicates only positive facts. So no godelian sentences could 
be written in a language uses p1. „This sentence is not ture” could be written neither it’s 
taught to be false, nor it’s taught to be true, so, simply speaking, problems of this kind 
could not be occured at all. Second, the kataphatic way of showing the False means 
substitution, because all negated formula could be substituted with the excluder of it’s 
positive base. Of course, in natural languages there are no defined excluders for any 
possible indication, but this is a factual and not a necessery state. A formal language 
without indication for negation, but with defined excluder of any regular formula might 
be constructed. For example, the indication of the excluder of „to be” or „true”, which 
are  - not predicates – could be the absence of indication, so, the empty space. Which 
means that in the case of some special terms as „to be” or „true”, their apophatic and 
kataphatic indication is the very same.   
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